logical chan ge. However, when it comes to ' the precise nature of the chan ge in volved in perception , we part ways with Aristotle. He thinks that the chan ge is on e of exemplification an d not on e of en codin g. We, by con trast, think that it is on e of en codin g an d not on e of exemplification . Aris totle is a perceptual realist: he thinks that there is actually red out there in the world ? An d so he thinks that when on e sees red on e's eyes go red (that is, the jelly (xoQ'I]) within the eyes goes red). Part of the body litera i ly takes on the perceptible quality in question : the chan ge exemplifies the quality. 3 We, or most of us, do not think that there is red out there in the world. We think that certain microphysical in teraction -described in terms of lightwaves an d the activation of rods an d con es -form the un derlyin g material story of vision . We think that the physiological process of seein g is a process of en codin g, rather than on e of exemplifyin g. An d so we think that when on e sees red on e's eyes un dergo a material alteration , but they do not literally go red. 2 Aristotle defines color as follows: "[ ... J color is universally capable of exciting change in the actually transparent, that is, in light; this being, in fact, the true nature of color" (418a31-b2; trans. Hicks). This suggests that color is not a sec ondary quality (in Locke's sense) and that it has causal powers. 3 This exemplification thesis has been forcefully argued by Richard Sorabji. See both his "Body and Soul in Aristotle", Philosophy, 49 (1974) , pp. 63-89; and his "Intentionality and Psychological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of Sense Perception" in Nussbaum and Rorty, 1992, pp. 195-225 Although we will refuse to follow Ar istotle on the details of his accoun t of perception, we do tend to embr ace the basic theory of hylomorphism. We think that livin g is bein g able to do certain thin gs an d that our actually doin g somethin g is, in prin ciple, explain ed (at least in par t) by refer ence to the body's doing somethin g: I see with my eyes, I walk with my legs, an d I think with my br ain . So at fir st blush we ar e Ar istotelian s. However, it also turn s out that when it comes to thought (which we think we do with our br ain s) Aristotle gives the curious appearance of not, himself, bein g an Ar istotelian . Throughout the fir st two books of the DA he repeatedly ges tur es towar d the possibility that in tellect is separable fr om the body (see 40 3a1 Of. , 41 1 bI5-1 9, 41 3a1 2-1 5 & 41 3b24-0-27 ). An d in the chapters of the thir d book that ar e devoted to the discussion of in tellect (i. e. chapters 4 & 5), he flat out says "in tellect is separable [ ... J" an d "this in tellect is se parable [ ... ] an d un mixed [ ... J" (429b5 & 430 aI7 ) .
By offerin g these claims, Ar istotle puts us in an awkward position . Her e we thought that we wer e Ar istotelian s an d it turn s out that by all appear an ces Ar istotle, himself, is not an Ar istotelian . The importan t question is: what are we to do with the seeming in con sisten cy? How is it that Ar istotle can appear to be committed to hylomorphism as a gen er al prin ciple an d yet also in the specific case of in tellect appear to reject hylomorphism? This is a pr oblem that has captur ed the atten tion Of a number of con tem porary scholars. The mor e popular strategies for dealin g with this question ar e two: fir st, (1 ) we might ar gue that Ar istotle's commitmen t to separ able intellect arises dir ectly out of his fascin ation with topics that lie outside of natural scien ce. Secon d, (2) we might ar gue that the seemin g pr oblem is a merely seeming pr oblem, on e that can be explain ed away as issuin g fr om a misguided approach to the text. In accor dan ce with the fir st strategy, (la) it has been ar gued that Ar istotle's views on theology an d ethics requir e that he tr eat in tellect as separable. 4 (1 b) It has also been ar gued that, while wr itin g the chapters on in tellect in the DA, Ar istotle was still a youn g stu den t of Plato an d thus offered an essen tially Platon ic accoun t. s In accor dan ce with the secon d strategy, (2 a) it has been ar gued that separable in tel lect is not in fact offered by Ar istotle as separable fr om the body but on ly as separ able in abstraction: as the rectan gularity of a abstraction fr om its material. 6 (2 b) It has also been argued that Aristotle is, perhaps, not concerned with human intellect when he makes certain claims to separability in the DA , rather he may be concerned with God itself (which, following one reading of Metaphysics XII.7 & 9, is wholly sepa rate from the corporeal world). 7
While these strategies may constitute Jall-back-positions they are far from ideal. Neither takes seri ously Aristotle's general commitment in the DA to explore issues within the context of natural science (see 40 2a4-7 , 403b8-16 & 412al-16) . Ethics, for example, is not natural science. 8 Nor does either str ategy take seriously Aristotle's commitment in the DA to study the capacities of peri shable beings. 9 Neither rectangulari ty nor God is a perishable being (the former is a quality and the latter is not perish able). 10 So, if we are to make sense of Aristotle's claiming in the DA that intellect is separable, we must find an interpretative strategy that takes into account the fact that the DA is a treatise on natural science (with all that this entails for Aristotle). Here I would like to propose a third strategy: (3) the seeming tension within the DA is just what it seems: a tension within 6 Michael Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, Yale University Press, 1988, especially chapter 5. Wedin's thesis directly concerns the active intellect of DA 1II.5. However, since Wedin holds that the discussion in DA III.5 consti tutes a refinement of the account in DA 1II .4, he is committed to the view that Aristotle explains the thesis (argued for in 1II.4) that intellect is separable in terms of the separability of active intellect (in III.5). 7 Jonathan Barnes, "Aristotle's Concept of Mind", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 72 (1971-72) , pp. 101-114. 8 One element within the groundwork of Aristotle's ethical system in his psycho logical theory (see Nicomachean Ethics (NE) 1.7 & 1.13). So, while Aristotle's psychology is not dependent on his ethics, his ethics is (in part) dependent on his psychology. 9 In DA 11.3, Aristotle sets out a hierarchical nesting of the psychic capacities. He holds that all perceivers must function nutritively and that all thinkers must function perceptually (see 414b28-415a13). This nesting shows that within the DA Aristotle is· not interested in accounting for the life of God, since his God (that is, his prime mover) is neither capable of perceiving nor capable of func tioning nutritively (see Metaphysics XII.9). 10 Wedin argues that the separability of active intellect is akin to the separability of mathematical objects: active intellect is not actually separate from matter, but it can be thought of as if it were (see Wedin, 1988, pp. 191-193) . In Metaphy sics VI. I , Aristotle claims that mathematical objects can be thought of as if they were changeless (aXLV1]tu) (1026a9). Further, he glosses 'changeless' with 'eternal' (atOLOV) (l026a9f.). Wedin asserts that this is the sort of eternality that Aristotle ascribes to active intellect (at DA III.5, 430a23). There are at least two problems with this view. First, Aristotle does not claim that active intellect is the DA . II On the face of it this is to say very little (except to say that the tension cannot be explained away as issuing from a misguided approach to the' text [pace 2a & 2b]). However, in its simplicity this strategy opens up a line of investigation that is little explored. It suggests that the rationale for the doctrine of separable intellect is grounded in Aristotle's own com mitment to the principles of scientific explanation (and so is grounded neither in certain peculiarities of his own personal history [pace I b] nor in theories introduced and explicated in the rather remote treatises on ethics and theology [pace 1 a]). This, then, is my deeper thesis: Aristotle is in clined to reject the hylomorphic account of intellect, because he is among other things a good natural scientist and the empirical facts (as he under stands them) suggest that a hylomorphic account would be untenable.
In offering this view, I am placing the doctrine of separable intellect within a special category: doctrines which constitute exceptions to Aris totle's own general principles and yet are offered on the grounds of empiri cal considerations. This is not a category that I create ad hoc; for in addi tion to the doctrine of separable intellect, Aristotle has at least one other doctrine that falls within this category: the doctrine of spontaneous genera tion. In the Generation of Animals (GA ), a work on natural science, Aris totle sets out the theory that certain creatures, most notably shellfish (and certain crustaceans), do not come-to-be out of a process of re-production via existing mature members of their species, but come-to-be out of purely material causes, for example out of the bubbling of sea-water and mud in the hot sun (GA 762a18-32; cf. Metaphysics Vrr.9, l034b3-7). This doc trine is an exception to Aristotle's own standard view of how living things come-into-being. On the standard view, the form of the nascent creature is as-if eternal, he simply says that it is eternal. Second (and more importantly), active intellect is the efficient cause of thought. (This is required by Aristotle's claim that active intellect is related to passive intellect as art is related to matter; see DA I1I.5, 430aI0-13.) Active intellect, thus, plays a role in the pursuit of an end (lEAO<;). Abstractions, however, do not seek an end (see Parts of Animals (PA) 1. 1 64 lbl l-15). They are not productive. Thus, active intellect cannot be adequately understood as an abstraction. II This does not imply this same tension cannot be found elsewhere in the Corpus.
It can be found in the Generation of Animals (GA). In GA 11.3, Aristotle asserts that the principle of all soul, except intellect, is not without matter, while intel lect enters the developing fetus, not via a material vehicle, but "from outside" (737a8-1O). His rationale for this assertion seems to be the bald declaration that "no bodily activity has any connection with the activity of reason" (736b27f.). If we are to find an argument in support of this view, I suspect we shall find it in DA IlIA.
that which is passed on from its parents (or parent) through the re-produc tive process: there are chicks, owing to the natural activities of chickens, and there are kids, owing to the natural activities of goats.
However, in his own researches, Aristotle finds that certain facts cannot be explained on the model of re-production. First, he takes it as a fact that barnacles have come-into-being off the coast of Rhodes where nothing of the kind had previously existed (GA 763a26-33). Second, he takes it as'a fact that when a large group of oysters were moved out of their muddy en vironment on the island of Lesbos to areas where mud does not collect (owing to fast-moving tides) they did not become more numerous, but only increased in size (GA 763a33-b5). The facts, then, (as he sees them) are that barnacles arise without having parents and populations of mature oys ters (i. e. prima facie potential parents) do not generate offspring (no matter how long they are left to their own devices). The facts cannot be explained on the standard model and so, in order to save the appearances, Aristotle accounts for them by offering the doctrine of spontaneous generation. It is as an empirical scientist that Aristotle introduces his doctrine. Thus, one lesson that we may draw from his discussion of the generation of animals is that Aristotle is not timorous of acknowledging what the data of experi ence seem to require and he will offer theories govern ing special-cases, even when such special-case theories are in opposition to his own standard view. Here I want to suggest that this lesson can be applied to the doctrine of separable intellect. Let us now tum to an examination of the relevant passages.
12 § 2 Aristotle's Task: De Anima 11/.4 429al 0-13
Aristotle opens the chapter both by indicating that he is making a fresh start (discussing a new topic) and by indicating that certain methodological principles will govern his investigation into the nature of intellect. He states, Concerning the part of the soul by which it both knows and thinks, [a] whether it is separable in respect to extension or is not, but is (only) separable in respect to (its) account, [b] (we must consider) what differentia it has and [c] (we must con sider) how thinking ever comes to be. (429a I0-13) 12 In the remainder of this paper, I offer an account of those passages from DA I1I.4 that are crucial to understanding the rationale behind the doctrine of separ able intellect: my focus is on 429alO-b5. I do not offer anything approaching an exhaustive account of the chapter.
Section [a] is formulaic. The question of whether a given facul ty is separ able in respect to extension or in respect to account is Aristotle's standard way of marki ng the start of a fresh anal ysis of a given psychol ogical fa cUl ty. J3 Section [c) provides faint signs of Ari stotle's concern that the study of intellect may pose its own unique problems (and perhaps not fit the standard model: hyl omorphism). 1 4 It is section [b) that provides the reader with the important sign concern ing methodol ogy. In his investiga tion Aristotl e will displ ay the differentia of intell ect: he wil l identify the distinguishing characteristics of noetic activity. Thus, in the investigation he will follow his standard mode of scientific investigation, as is both sketched in DA U 1 S and set out more fully in the Posterior Analytics (A Po). He wil l proceed from what is more knowable to us (at an early stage) to what is more knowabl e by nature: he will begin by identifying a number of the properties of that which he is studying and then attempt to expl ain how these properties can jointl y obtain: he will gather the data and infer to the best expl anation. In so doing, he will approach knowl edge of the essence of that which he is investigating (here intellect). And he wil l approach this knowl edge, because it is the essence of a thing that explains its properties (see AP o 76bll-23).
13 In DA III.9, Aristotle begins his treatment of the faculty of desire by asking "whether it is some one part of the soul, which is separable in respect to exten sion or in respect to its account or whether it is the whole soul" (432aI9-21), and in DA II.2, after offering what is his ultimate definition of soul, he intro duces an account of various psychic faculties by noting that "whether each one of these is a soul or part of a soul and, if a part, whether it is only separable in respect to its account or is separable in respect to place also is a question [ .. .]" (4 13b 13-1S). 14 It should be noted that this section carries greater force than is suggested by some of the modem English translations. Aristotle does not simply state that it is an 'aim of his discussion to explain the process of thinking: he does not write "OXEJt1:EOV [ . .. J JtwC; ytvE't<U 'to VOELV" -"we must consider [ ... J how thinking comes about" -as is sometimes suggested. (This is Hicks' translation. Hett fares no better with his "how thinking comes about".) Rather he writes "OXEJt'tEOV [ ... J JtwC; JtO'tE yLvE't<U 'to voeLv" ; his aim is to consider how it is that we ever come to think. He is already concerned that his standard model will not apply·in the case of intellect. 15 In DA I.l, Aristotle claims that knowledge of attributes (and properties) is an aid towards gaining knowledge of essence (402b2l f.) and he indicates that the search for the essence (or definition) will appropriately begin with an account of attributes (402b22-2S). Further, he claims that the mark of whether a definition is scientific (i. e. non-dialectical) is whether it leads to knowledge of attributes ( 402b2S-403a2). § 3 Characteristics of Intellect: De Anima IlI.4, 429a13-b5
Aristotl e now embarks on his positive investigation into the nature of intellect by introducing two of its distinguishing characteristics. First (I), intell ect (being a cognitive faculty: a facul ty that judges; see 418a14, 422a21, 424a5, 426blO, 427a18-20 & 432a16) is in rough outline formally akin to perception. Second (2), unl ike perception, intellect grasps all things. Characteristic (1) has al ready received some treatment earlier in the DA. Regarding this characteristic, Aristotle now states, Of course, [d] if thought is like perception, then it will be a sort of being acted upon by the object of thought or something else of this sort.
[e] Thus it must be unaffected (WtaeE�) and receptive of the form (O£X'tLXQV be tou £tOO1J�), that is it will be potentially such as this but not this, and as the faculty of perception is related to the objects of perception so will intellect be similarly related to the objects of thought. (429aI3-l8)
In DA 11.5 Aristotle claims that perception and intellect each have an EVEQYELa, an actualization that is a perfection of a nature. From this it follows that active thinking does not require an alteration (aA.A.OLWoL�) or, if it does, its alteration cannot be of the sort which brings about a change away from a nature (417b9-16). In this respect intellect, along with perception, is unaffected (WtaeE�) 1 6. Further, he claims that perception requires a being acted upon, a being affected, through which the faculty (or organ) becomes like its object (417a I8-20). In DA 11.12, he describes this being acted upon as a reception of (perceptible) form without matter (424aI7-21). (This reception of form is (in part) the process of coming to exemplify the perceptible quality.) Finally in 11.5, he marks an important dissimilarity between perception and thought: while the efficient cause of perception is always outside of the perceiver, that of intellection can be internal; for, once we have acquired concepts, we are able to think on our own whenever we wish (417bI9-28). In our passage (429a I3-18, quoted above), Aristotle reminds the reader of the specific formal similarities (and dissimilarities) between perception and intellect introduced in 11.5 and further indi cates that the 11.12 refinement of the account of perception will have an analogue in the. account of intellect. In section [d] , instead of identifying the object of thought as the efficient cause, he shows that a more refined account may be needed: it is perhaps "something else", not the mere object of thought, that is the efficient cause of thought. In section tel, he shows that both the 11.5 position that thought is unaf fected and an analogue of the 11. 12 refinement for the account of perception will be at play in shaping his theory of intellect: just as perception is a reception of form, so is intellection. 17
16 Aristotle does not actually use the word WtaeE� in 11.5. Rather he claims that intellect should be said not to suffer (OUOE mlOX£LV; 417b13 f.). This is equiva lent to the claim that intellect is WtaeE�. Characteristic (2) -intellect grasps all things -appears to be new in the DA (although, as we shall see, it is in keeping with a methodological prin ciple-that is set forth earlier in the DA). Aristotle now introduces this char acteristic and begins to draw out the implications of its conjunction with characteristic (1). He states, Thus, since [f] it thinks all things, [g) it must be unmixed, just as Anaxagoras says, in order for it to rule, that is in order for it to know [h) for the alien (form) present along with it hinders and obstructs it [ ... ) (429a I8-2 1)
The claim in [f] , that intellect grasps all things, is in harmony with a meth odological principle that Aristotle develops in DA IT.4: the faculty-func tion-object condition (FFO condition). 18 In that chapter, Aristotle asserts that activities and functions are prior in account to faculties and that ob jects are prior in account to activities and functions (see 415a l 4-22). The FFO condition, then, requires that a psychic faculty be defined in terms of its function and its function in terms of its objects. It follows analytically from this condition that intellect is receptive of the objects of intellect: in tellect (voi)£) is the faculty that is receptive of intelligible objects (vOllta) and any object that is not of the sort to be received by intellect is not an intelligible object. However, this alone gives us no insight into the nature of object of thought: the FFO condition is a general principle guiding the explanation of any given psychic faculty and, as su6h, it leaves object of thought open as a placeholder which must be given content from else-I have offered is gleaned from the consequent clause in [d) and from [e), which is also dependent upon the antecedent in [d). Thus my account relies on the as sumption that Aristotle implicitly asserts the antecedent of [d). One might argue that this supposition is not justified. It could be that the conditional structure of [d) is a sign of trepidation (on Aristotle's part) over whether intellect is in fact like perception. I suggest that Aristotle is at the beginning of I1I.4 unsure about how far the analogy with perception will take him and he is in some way unsure about the conclusion he draws from the analogy, but he is not worried about whether perception and intellect are akin in the specific ways that are addressed in [d) and [e): nowhere in the DA does he reject either the notion that thought is a sort of being acted upon or the notion that it is a reception of form (although, in 111.5 he suggests that thought is not simply a sort of being acted upon and that the efficient cause of thought goes beyond the mere reception of form). Aristotle begins his discussion of intellect with a conditional statement because he is going to set out an important disanalogy between perception and intellect (at 429a29-b5) and so he wants to be careful not to appear to think that the two are in all respects analogous. (Here we should also note that some of Aristotle's pre decessors took perception and intellect to be the same faculty; see DA 111.3, 427a21-29.) 18 On the FFO condition, see Wedin, 1988, pp. 13 ff. where. 19 So, while the FFO condition helps us to see that Aristotle's claim, in [fl, amounts to the assertion that thought thinks all objects of thought, 2 0 we must look beyond the FFO condition in order to better asses the impli cations of the claim.
Aristotle does not (in the DA) offer a precise account of the shared na ture of objects of thought, but he does offer a broad classification of such objects. He holds that to think is to be fully active in respect to knowledge and that knowledge (in the strict sense) is of universals (417 bl6-23). Thought, then, (in the strict sense) is of universals. Further, he holds that we entertain universals from within the three subaltern genera of the intel ligible: the theoretical, the practical, and the productive.
21 As theoretical thinkers, we entertain those universals which are the objects of mathe matics (the objects of arithmetic, geometry, etc. ), natural science (the ob jects of botany, zoology, etc. ), and metaphysics. As practical thinkers, we entertain universals pertaining to human conduct (in the areas of political science, household management, etc. ). And as productive thinkers, we en tertain those universals which are the objects of the creative disciplines (the objects of carpentry, medicine, etc. ). Thus, for Aristotle, the objects of thought constitute a rich, complex and diverse group. And so one implica tion of the claim that intellect grasps all things is that intellect must have the power, breadth of reach and adaptability of functioning that is requisite for coming to grasp all objects from within this varied group. In our passage (429a18-21, quoted above), Aristotle brings the model of reception of fonn to bear on the notion that intellect grasps all things: he works within the project of inferring to the best explanation by assessing how it is that these two characteristics can jointly obtain within intellect. Ultimately, the main issue is how to accommodate the power, breadth and adaptalJility of intellect within the model of reception of fonn which, in the case of perception, brings with it a number of forceful constraints. Thus, in ord er to assess the arguments by which Aristotle attempts to re solve this issue, we must first make explicit the nature of the constraints 19 In the same manner the FFO condition leaves object of perception (a' w8rrtov) open as a placeholder which must be given content from elsewhere. Aristotle provides this content in DA n.6-11, where he offers accounts of the various sen sory modalities, beginning in each case with a treatment of the objects that fall within each modality. 20 I would also suggest that "rtavta" at 429al8 picks up on "tex vOTlta" which comes earlier in the same line. If this is correct, then "thought thinks all things" quite straightforwardly means "thought thinks all objects of thought". I would like to thank Derek Kershaw for bringing this point to my attention. Constraint (1): in respect to the successful reception of particular forms, the or gan of perception must be by nature trans-formal: its nature must be such that it does not exemplify any of the forms that it is in principle capable of receiving. This constraint is operative in different ways for different types of sensory modalities.
For the distal senses (sight, hearing and smell), the constraint demands that each organ be wholly free of. any of the forms which it could in principle receive (or ex emplify). The eye, for example, must be colorless, if it is to come to exemplify its special objects: if the eye is to go red (or green or blue), it must in its natural state be without color (it must be transparent). For the proximal sense (the modalities of touch: touch and taste), the constraint demands, not that each organ be entirely free of any of the forms which are among its special objects, but that, since the organ itself must exemplify certain tactile qualities, it must lack the capacity to receive a form which it is currently (by nature) exemplifying. (So, one cannot come to the tactile awareness of the temperature of an external object, if its temperature is the same as the temperature of one's body; for, if one currently exemplifies that tem perature, one cannot come to exemplify it: one cannot receive what one already has.) So, the proximal senses will have blind-spots (see DA 423b30-424alO).
Constraint (2): in respect to the scope of a particular organ of perception, the material constitution of each organ limits it to the capacity to come to awareness of only a particular species of the perceptible (we see with our eyes, we hear with our ears: but we neither hear with our eyes nor see with our;ears). Each organ is formed for the purpose of functioning for the sake of its own (limited) end and so the matter of each organ is specifically suited to the organ's being able to so function . . The matter of each sense organ is not suited to function for the sake of the (limited) ends of any other sense organ. 23
Constraint (3): in respect to the failure to receive particular forms, each organ, because of the nature of its material constitution, will lack the capacity to receive certain specifiable perceptibles within its own modality. While animal species will differ in respect to the range of the perceptibles of which they can become aware (e. g. Laconian hounds have a keener sense of smell than humans (GA 781b2-13) and humans have a keener sense of touch than any other creature (DA 42 1a2 1-23», each species must, in respect to each sensory modality (which it possesses), have a limited range. The range of a given organ will be limited in a number of ways: an object w.ill go unperceived, if (type a) it is too distant from the perceiver (this, of course, will apply only to the distal senses), or (type b) if it is too faint, or (type c) if it is too intense. In addition, certain parts of perceived objects will go unperceived, if (type d) they are too rich in minute detail. One of these sorts of failure (to per ceive) is not a failure of the organ per se. Failure to perceive distant objects (type a) is both a function of the external medium (one cannot see as far on a foggy day as on a clear day) and a function of the shape of certain bodily parts that are associated with perception. (So, Laconian hounds have a keener sense of smell, because they have long nostrils and quadrupeds can hear more distant sounds than birds, because the latter have only the auditory passage, while the former have this and the (exter nal) ear as well; see GA 731al4--21 with PA 657a 12-24). The remaining sorts of perceptual failure are failures of the organ per se. One fails to see minute detail (type d), because no sense organ can be perfect in its purity (no organ is a perfect mirror of the outside world 24 ). One fails to perceive faint perceptibles (type b), be cause these lack sufficient causal power to bring about an alteration within the or-23 One might argue that this cannot be a legitimate Aristotelian constraint, since Aristotle requires that the matter of an organ possess the same property that the external medium possesses in virtue of being the medium (the eye must be trans parent, etc.) and this property can be realized in a number of sorts of matter (both water and air are transparent, etc.). Thus, (it may be argued) Aristotle is open to the conceptual possibility that not only could eyes be made of either air or water, but the same (say) watery organ could be both an eye and an ear. (This finds additional support on the traditional reading of DA IlL 1. For a persuasive attack on the traditional reading see Tim Maudlin, "De Anima III 1: Is any Sense Missing?", Phronesis, XXX (1986), n. 1, pp. 51-67.) However, there are clear indications that Aristotle requires much more of the matter of an organ than that it be akin to the relevant medium. In the De Sensu (DS) he argues that the eye must be composed of water and not of air, since water is more easily confined and controlled (see 438a13-17) and in the DA he suggests that the ear must be composed of air and not of water, since sound does not travel through water as well as it does through air (see 419b [18] [19] [20] . This shows that constraint (2) is a legitimate Aristotelian constraint. 24 In DS 3, Aristotle claims that transparency is in fact not special to certain sorts of matter, rather everything is transparent in one degree or another (see 439a18-gan of perception (GA 779b35-780a9). And one fails to perceive (certain) intense perceptibles (type c), because the intense alteration which these bring about in the organ ruptures its material constitution and destroys it (see OA 435b I 3-15). Con nected with these last two types of failure (types b & c) is the additional failure to perceive relatively faint perceptibles, after perceiving relatively intense ones (type e). This failure is due to the lack of sufficient causal power in the faint perceptible to bring about an alteration within the organ, given the presence there of an intense alteration, brought about through the prior agency of an intense perceptible (see OA 429a31-b3 & GA 780alO-13). These, then, are the constraints imposed by Aristotle within the study of intellect owing to its kinship with perception.
Let us now examine Aristotle's assessment of the impact which these constraints have upon the characteristic that thought is capable of thinking any object of thought. In section [h], Aristotle brings constraint (1) to bear on the characteristics; he supposes that if intellect were to possess a from prior to thinking, then this form would hinder its ability to receive its ob jects. 25 And he infers that, since intellect is capable of receiving any intel ligible object, it must be formless, yet capable of receiving forms. In sec tion [g], he draws a tentative inference from the conclusion that intellect must not possess a form: he asserts that intellect is, as Anaxagoras says, unmixed. 26 This tentative inference to the claim that intellect is unmixed is strengthened just a few lines later, when Aristotle states, 27). I take this to imply both that no thing is purely non-transparent and that no thing is purely transparent. From the later it follows that no eye is a perfect mir ror of the visible world. 25 Aristotle's argument here is markedly similar to Anaxagoras' argument in sup port of the claim that intellect is unmixed. Anaxagoras states, "Mind [ . . . J is mixed with nothing [ . . . J for if it were not by itself, but was mixed with anything else [ . . . J the things that were with it would hinder it so that it could rule noth ing" (OK 59B I 2). In each of these arguments the unmixedness of intellect fol lows from the supposition that if it were mixed its capacity would be limited. Cherniss suggests that Aristotle is not justified in interpreting Anaxagoras' "rul ing all things" to mean "knowing all things" (see his Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, Cornell University Press, 1935, p. 172, n. 122). But one must question whether this is an apt criticism, for in OK 59B l2 Anaxagoras does explicitly associate the ability of intellect to rule all things with its ability to knows all things. 26 For Anaxagoras this means that intellect has nothing in common with anything else, rather it is purely what it is and it is nothing else: intellect lacks any sort of material nature (see OK 59B I 2). One might argue that Aristotle is here simply embracing the theory of a predecessor and that he is thus not advancing an argu ment based on his own empirical and scientific concerns. I would reject this view for two reasons: (I) empirical considerations arising out of his assessment
[i] So, it is reasonable (EUA.OYOV) to consider it [intellect] not to be mixed with the body; [j] (for if it were), it would come to have some quality, (like) either cold or hot, and [k] it would even have an organ, as the perceptual faculty does; but now intellect has no organ. (429a24--27) In section [j), Aristotle supplies the cand idate qualities -hot and cold -to further illustrate the impact of constraint (1) . If the organ of intellect were mixed with the body, it would have certain perceptible qualities, say hot or cold, and thus its ability to receive its objects could be limited: it might fail to have the capacity to think all things insofar as it might suffer from blind-spots. This consideration does not force Aristotle to embrace the view that intellect is not mixed with the body. It is the proximal sense modalities alone that have blind-spots (owing to the necessary presence of tactile qualities within their respective organs). The distal senses are not constrained in this way. Thus, since Aristotle has not argued in support of the view that intellect is somehow more ak in to the proximal sense moda lities than to the distal ones, his exploration into the issue of how con straint ( 1) impacts upon the notion that intellect grasps all things generates no conclusive result. 27 At this stage in the larger investigation, Aristotle is building a case which suggests that intellect is separable from the bod y. He has not unearthed conclusive support for the thesis.
of the distinguishing characteristics of intellect are what bring Aristotle to tenta tively embrace a neo-Anaxagorian theory and (2) in the second half of DA IlI.4 Aristotle suggests that Anaxagoras' own theory cannot be completely right, since it creates an unbridgeable gap between mind and its objects (see 429b23-430a9). Aristotle's worry that Anaxagoras fails to explain how it is that we ever come to think is prefigured in DA 1.2 (see 405b20-23). 27 Christopher Shields supposes that, if Aristotle's justification for the claim that intellect grasps all things is directed upon the range of its potential objects, then his overriding concern is with the problem of blind-spots. Accordingly, Shields argues that Aristotle's argument would rest on the thin observation that "if nous is structured, there will be one form it cannot acquire" (Shields, 1997, p. 325; my emphasis). This consideration, Shields contends, does not seem forceful enough to motivate Aristotle's claim that intellect is separable from the body (especially when the form that intellect could not acquire would be the form that it already has and, thus, it would become unclear why intellect needs to acquire that form in order to think that very same form; see Shields, p. 329). This is one reason why Shields rejects the view that it is a concern over the range of poten tial objects of intellect that motivates Aristotle's claim that intellect grasps all things. Aristotle, however, is concerned not only with the possibility of blind spots (a constraint (1) concern). He is concerned with issues connected with constraint (2) and constraint (3). These concerns (as we shall see) do ultimately motivate his claim that intellect is separable from the body.
In section [k] , Ar istotle bri ng s constraint (2) to bear on the notion that thought thinks all things. If intellect were instantiated in a material organ, it niight be limited in scope: it mig ht be limited to the reception of one subaltern genus of the intelligible as opposed to the others (as each organ of perception is limited to one sensory modality as opposed to the others) ? 8 This consideration suggests that intellect is unmixed with the body. But as section [i) makes clear, Aristotle is not committed (at this stage) to the notion tha t thoug ht is unmixed (or separable). At this stage he considers the view to be reasonable (EUAOYOV): he holds it to have a certain plausibility.
It is constraint (3) which, for Aristo tle, most forcefully suggests (and all but conclu sivel y su pports) the thesis that separability is (par t of) the es sence of intellect. Aristotle states, [I] That the unaffectedness of the perceptual faculty differs from that of the intel lect is made manifest upon (a consideration of) the organs of perception and per ception (itself). For the perceptual' faculty loses its ability to perceive after (expo sure to) an intense perceptible, as with sound after big noises, and after strong colors and smelIs (it is) neither able to see nor able to smelI; but whenever intel lect thinks some intense intelligible, it is not less able to think the inferior ones, rather it is better able to do so; [m] for the perceptual faculty is not without the body, but intelIect is separable (from the body). (429a3 1-b5)
In section [1 ], Ar istotle asserts that the cognition of in tense intelligibles, far from impeding our ability to think inferior ones, seems to make us better able to think them. This is in marked contrast to the data on perception; for, when we perceive intense perc eptibles our ability to perceive faint ones is impeded (constraint 3, type e). The distinction that Aristotle offers here between intense and inferior objects of thoug ht is the same distinction that he develops in Metaphysics A.2 between more accurate (UXQL�EOtE QOv) or superior (UQXLXU)'"CEQUV) knowledge and subor dinate (tJJt llQE tOVOlle;) knowledge. In Metaphysics 1.2 he claims that the most accurate or most knowable objects of thought are first principles and causes. Further, he claims that it is thr ough kn owledge of these that the particulars which fall under them come to be kn own (see 982a13-1 8; cf. AP o 72a26-3 8).
28 Aristotle's claim that intelIect has no organ (429a27) should not be taken simply as the (false) empirical claim that as a matter of observational biology no organ of thought has been found. (On this view it would be most peculiar of him to say that it is consequently (merely) reasonable to consider intelIect to be un mixed with the body; see Shields 1997, pp. 307 f. & 3l3f.) Rather, Aristotle is arguing that, in light of his own assessment of the distinguishing characteristics of intellect, it is now unlikely that intelIect has an organ.
Thus, in section [1] , Aristotle points to a conspicuous fact about our cogni tive lives: when we know principles and causes within a given domain we are better abl e to ju dge other things wh ich fall within that domain. It is clear that, in this respec t, intellect cannot be govern ed by constraint (3). It cannot be so govern ed, because one conseq uence of th is constraint is that material instantiation leaves a faculty vu lnerable to the destru ctive forces of intense objects. Intellect, unfazed in its command of principles and causes, lacks one important sort of affectedness that is suffered by percep tion and this lack of affectedness, Ari stotle su ggests, is due to intellect's having an immaterial nature. So, Aristotle infers (in section [mD that intel lect is separable from the body: intellect, with its power, breadth and adaptability of functioning, is (u nlike its kindred faculty: perception) un mixed and separ able, not the actuality of any part of the body whatsoever. From our investigation, it is cl ear that the (initial) project of DA I1 I. 4 fits sq uarely within Aris totle's standard methodology of scientifi c investiga tion. He shows that there is a topic of investigation: intellect. He introduces distinguishing characteristics: intellect is formally aki n to perception and it grasps all things. And he infers to the best expla nation, offering the only account which seems to expl ain how th ese characteristics jointly obtain: he saves the appearances by separating the intellect from the body. So, it is his standard scientifi c meth odology which, together with the empirical facts, draws Aristotl e towards a special-case theory for intellect: a theory that is in opposition to his own general theory for explaining psychological capac ities (hyl omorphism). § 4 Getting the Facts Right: A Moral Aristotle seems to have the facts on intellect wrong. Firs t, he has the data on perception wrong (the material process of perception is one of en coding and not one of exemplification) and for this reason he mistakenly supposes that if intellect were mixed with the body this would require that thought be a process of exemplification (in the appropriate organ) rather than a process of encoding. The merits of an encoding thesis, in contrast with an exemplification thesis, ar e th at it would allow Aristotle to do away with the problem of blind-spots (since what exemplifi es a quality can also encode it) and it would allow him to circumvent the problem of intense intelligibles (since the encoding of an intense object need not itself involve intense materi al changes). However, Ar istotle is clearly worr ied both about the possibility of blind-spots and about the problem of intense intelligibles. So, we cannot suppose that he gives any serious consideration to an encod ing thesis within this investigation. 29
Second, Aristotle mistakenly takes the linguistic parallel between intense objects of perception and intense objects of thought to imply that if intellect were mixed with the body there would also be a problematic physiological parallel between the affectedness of active perception and the affectedness of active thought. In the To p ics, he warns his own students to be on the lookout for this very sort of inferential error. In the context of discussing the role of homonyms in dialectic Aristotle warns that the same term may in different circumstances have different contraries and that this shows that a term occuring in two such circumstances will not have the same meaning in each (see Topics l06al-23). In the Topics, his example is the sharp (6!;u<;). Its contrary in respect to music is the flat (�oQu), but its contrary in respect to matter is the dull (a!l/3A.u). Accordingly, Aristotle claims that sharp does not have the same meaning in respect to music as it does in respect to matter. Now, in DA I1I.4 Aristotle uses the same term (crcpMQO) for the intensity of both perceptibles and thinkables. However, he does not use the same term for their respective contrar ies. The inferior intelligibles are said to be UltOOEE<JlEQO, while the weak percepti bles are said to be either acr8Evr1<; or IUXQO<;. He never terms the former acr8Evr1<; or I-tLXQO<; and he never terms the latter UltOOEEcrtEQO. This might suggest that intense does not have the same meaning in respect to perception as it does in respect to thought. For this reason, Aristotle should be more cautious about the implications of the linguistic parallel between crCPOOQo thoughts and crcpMQo perceptibles.
Finally, it is unfortunate that in assessing the impact of constraint (3) upon the thesis' that intellect grasps all things Aristotle draws only a comparison between thought and perception as full actualities. For, while knowledge (already won) of causes and principles does make it easier to properly judge other things, the process of coming to win over such knowledge (of principles and causes) is often both pain ful and fatiguing. And, even though Aristotle does elsewhere acknowledge this fact (see Metaphysics 11.1, 993b9-11), it is clear that its further consideration in the DA would suggest a revision of the theory of intellect. Exposure to intense perceptibles is physiologically taxing, but then so is the process of coming to learn principles. This physiological parallel between affectedness in perception and affectedness in thought suggests that the general theory for explaining psychological capacities (hy lomorphism) may in the end be adequate as a model for explaining thought. At the least it suggests that thought has a greater degree of kinship with perception than Aristotle acknowledges in the opening section of DA I1I.4.
In light of this investigation one could argue for the restoration of the account of intellect to Aristotle's standard model (hylomorphism) on grounds that make use of Aristotle' s own sci entifi c methodology: one could argue that, once we get the facts right, a plausible, and substantially Aristotelian, hylomorphic account of intellect becomes available to us. However, when we consider the obviou s diffi culties with the argument for the separability of intellect (not necessarily Aristotle's failure to consider an encoding thesis for thought, bu t certainly his reliance on the lingu istic parallel between intense percep tibles and intense intelligibles), together with the hypothetical nature of the beginning of the argu ment (at 429a1 3) and the larger context in which the argument is placed, another moral su g gests itself. It may be that Aristotle develops the theory of separable intel lect as a problem which demands further discussion: it may be that, whil e Aristotle is initially drawn (for scientific reasons) towards the view that in tellect is separable, he (u ltimately) str ives towards a more hylomorphic ac cou nt.
Aristotle is clearly aware that the theory of separable intellect is not withou t its own diffi cu lties. One diffi culty is that of how intellect is to come to possess its objects. These objects first exist (potentially) in materi al thi ngs, bu t material things (it wou ld seem) share no underl ying generic sameness with separable (immaterial) intellect. So, upon consideration of his own accou nt of agency and patiency, which requ ires that agent and pa tient hold something in common (see Generation and Corruption 1.7), it becomes unclear to Aristotle how it is that separable intellect, having noth ing in common with anything else, is to ever come to think (see DA I1 I. 4, 429b21 -26). 3o Aristotle, then, is not entirely at ease with the theory of se parable intellect. Fu rther, it is plau sible that part of his later discu ssion of intell ect (in DA I1 I. 5-8) is aimed at resolving problems within his initial account and it is plausible that he aims at resolving these problems by es tablishing the dependence of thought upon the body. In DA m.s, Aristotle introdu ces the active intellect ari d the passive intellect. These, on one plau sible interpretation, are the efficient and material cause of thought respec tively. Aristotle does not claim of passive intellect, as he does of active in tellect, that it is separable, rather he claims that it is perishable (see 430 al7 & 43 0 a4-25) . This su ggests that passive intellect is more closely linked with the bod y than is active intellect and this, I take it, is a sign that Aris-30 Aristotle attempts to solve this problem at the end of DA 1II.4 (see 430al-5).
Wedin is correct to argue that the solution proposed there is offered "strictly in terms of the language in which [ ... ] [the problem is] [ ... ] set" (Wedin, 1988, p. 167) . The solution fails to address the question of how it is that we come to think. It is only when Aristotle turns to the issue of the organization of intellect (in DA 111.5) that a substantial response to the problem emerges (see Wedin, 1988, pp. 169-195) . While I agree in broad outline with Wedin's assessment of the relation between DA 1II.4 and DA 1II.5, I disagree with much of his analysis of DA 111.5 (see note 10, above). For an alternative account of the relation be tween DA 1II.4 and DA III.5, see Victor Caston, "Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest proposal" (forthcoming in Phronesis).
totl e strives towards a more hyl omorphic account of intell ect in DA III. 5. Further, in DA 111 .7 f., Aristotl e argues for the thesis that episodes of tho ught are dependent upon the use (or acti vation) of images (qJCLvtCW!!CL ta). Images are, for Aristotl e, material items stored in the common sensor ium (see De Memoria 450a26-bll). So, this thesis requires that material change (bodily change) is a necessary condition for episodes of thought. 3 I This, I take it, is a sign that Ar istotl e strives towards a more hyl omorphic account of intellect in DA I1L 7 f. So, both in DA I1L 5 and DA II1.7 f. we find el ements within Aristotl e's discussion of intel lect that suggest he ul ti matel y strives to ease the tension between his initial account of intellect in DA rnA and his standard model for expl ain ing psychol ogical capacities (hyl omorphism). , 1997) , the 59t h annual meeting of the Virginia Philosophical Association, Newport News, Virginia (October, 1998) , and the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Berkeley, California (April 1999). I would like to thank Rob Bolton for his sustained criticism and encouragement and Sarah Broadie for helpful discussion on issues addressed on this paper.
